A strategic window for digital justice
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A strategic window for digital justice

Christina Dahl-Jensen

Digital technologies have become central to political authority, economic organisation and social life worldwide. Artificial intelligence now accelerates this transformation, creating new opportunities for health, education and governance while simultaneously amplifying inequality, enabling surveillance and eroding civic space.

The period from 2026 to 2028 is a rare and strategic moment in which global digital governance norms can still be shaped. The WSIS+20 outcome document and the operationalisation of the Global Digital Compact together create an institutional opening in which civil society, governments and faith-based organisations can influence the direction of global digital governance before norms and mandates become entrenched. This report identifies practical avenues for shaping that trajectory and outlines how to contribute to a just and sustainable digital future.

1 Setting the scene

Digital technologies increasingly structure political authority, economic organisation and human dignity across all regions, from the Pacific Islands to Latin America, from Africa to Europe and across Asia. They enable connection, knowledge creation and new forms of participation, yet they also deepen inequality, intensify surveillance, reorganise labour markets and contribute to a global contraction of civic space. These developments unfold within a geopolitical environment characterised by rapid technological acceleration, weakening multilateral structures and strategic competition among powerful states.

Artificial intelligence now sits at the centre of this transformation. Capabilities of the AI models evolve in cycles of months rather than years, increasingly influencing public administration, commercial markets, welfare provision, armed conflict and cultural life. This velocity challenges institutions that are designed for stability rather than speed. Analysts of global Internet governance have warned that the current architecture is drifting towards fragmentation, with overlapping initiatives emerging from states, corporations and technical bodies. The lack of a coherent governance architecture amplifies pressures on established frameworks such as WSIS and increases risks of forum shopping, divergent standards and the dilution of rights based approaches.

Inequality remains a defining feature of the digital era. Much of Africa and the Pacific continue to be constrained by limited access to high performance computing and sovereign cloud infrastructure, creating what several global analyses describe as “compute deserts”. Latin America faces intensifying extraction pressures linked to lithium, cobalt and copper, with implications for both ecological stability and geopolitical dependency. Across Asia, digital identity policies, broad cybersecurity legislation and expanding biometric systems are reshaping the boundaries of civic participation. In all regions, data extractivism continues to shift economic value away from the communities that generate it, while the cultural and linguistic hierarchies embedded within automated systems reinforce epistemic inequality.

Together, these dynamics illustrate the global “morality gap” described in the Club of Rome’s Earth for All (2023), in which extreme inequality, ecological degradation and exploitative resource use erode trust and social cohesion. The report’s proposals to treat minerals, data and knowledge as commons, and to develop fee and dividend models for shared benefit, offer a relevant conceptual framework for digital governance.

Geopolitics and militarisation further intensify the stakes of digital transformation. Strategic competition between major powers increasingly shapes decisions about fibre networks, satellite systems, computing supply chains and AI safety standards. Communications infrastructure, cloud platforms and emerging autonomous systems have become entangled with military planning, particularly in the Pacific and parts of Asia. The blurring of boundaries between civilian and military technologies raises concerns about automated escalation, machine speed conflict and the erosion of space for human deliberation. There is broad global consensus that autonomy must never be integrated into nuclear command structures. Growing public concern about the trajectory of frontier AI models is reflected in the Future of Life Institute’s 2025 call for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence until safety mechanisms and democratic consent are in place. These concerns underline the urgency of governance frameworks that ensure meaningful human control, accountability and the preservation of peace.

The environmental footprint of digital technologies adds further complexity. Mineral extraction for semiconductors and batteries affects fragile ecosystems and frontline communities, particularly in Latin America and Africa. Data centres exert growing pressure on water supplies and energy systems, while the global accumulation of electronic waste continues to accelerate. The climate crisis amplifies these vulnerabilities. Extreme weather events undermine infrastructure resilience, disrupt connectivity and heighten exposure to disinformation and digital exclusion. Digital justice and climate justice are therefore interdependent agendas that cannot be treated separately.

A people-centred and development-oriented information society

Yet the period 2026 to 2028 presents a significant governance opportunity. The WSIS+20 outcome document adopted in December 2025 reaffirmed the principles of a people-centred and development-oriented information society, granted the Internet Governance Forum permanent status within the United Nations system and initiated a new implementation cycle. The Global Digital Compact, endorsed in 2024 and annexed to the Pact for the Future, has now entered operationalisation. Key mechanisms such as the Independent Scientific Panel on AI, the United Nations Global Dialogue on AI Governance and strengthened roles for UNESCO, OHCHR, UNDP and the ITU will shape normative and institutional pathways for years ahead. At the regional level, the African Union, European Union, ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Inter American system are simultaneously revising or expanding their digital governance strategies, creating multiple sites where global commitments may be interpreted and embedded.

The direction these developments take remains open. Without coordinated and justice-centred engagement, governance risks drifting towards securitisation, technocratic managerialism or fragmented national approaches that leave questions of dignity, accountability and equity at the margins. Conversely, grounding the interpretation of the Global Digital Compact in the WSIS principles of inclusion, openness, human rights and development oriented governance offers a path toward an institutional architecture capable of addressing the social, environmental and ethical consequences of digital transformation.

Faith based organisations and ecumenical bodies have a distinctive role within this landscape. They remain among the most trusted civic institutions globally, with the ability to operate where civic space is restricted, document harms, protect vulnerable communities and articulate ethical framings rooted in relationality, stewardship and justice. Their networks link local contexts to regional and multilateral debates, enabling them to translate lived experience into evidence that informs policy making. Their tradition of moral discernment and prophetic critique positions them to contribute perspectives often missing from technical or market dominated governance arenas.

The complexity and pace of contemporary technological change require advocacy that is coordinated, grounded in values and capable of operating at the speed of AI development. This report responds to that need by identifying strategic opportunities across the United Nations system and regional bodies, clarifying where influence is possible, and outlining how a mission driven and portfolio based approach can support effective, ethically grounded digital justice advocacy during this critical period.

2 The UN General Assembly and the WSIS+20 outcome document

The United Nations General Assembly remains the primary political arena where the relationship between the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the Global Digital Compact (GDC) will be interpreted. Discussions in 2025 highlighted the need to clarify the interaction between the two processes, particularly regarding institutional roles and how overlaps should be managed. These concerns informed the WSIS+20 outcome document adopted in December 2025.

The outcome document positions WSIS as the established institutional framework for implementing digital commitments, while the GDC provides the overarching political vision endorsed through the Pact for the Future. It reaffirms the WSIS principle that rights offline must be protected online and allocates responsibilities across ITU, UNGIS, the Internet Governance Forum, UNESCO, OHCHR and UNDP. The Compact, supported by ninety-three states, expresses a shared commitment to an open, safe, inclusive and sustainable digital future aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals.

Member States held differing views on the degree of alignment required between WSIS and the Compact. Some argued for closer integration to enhance coherence and reduce fragmentation, whereas others preferred parallel processes out of concern for sovereignty and perceived over emphasis on human rights. The final outcome reflects a compromise: the political relevance of the Compact is recognised, but WSIS structures remain unchanged, and no formal hierarchy is introduced.

The WSIS+20 outcome launches a renewed implementation cycle with the following elements:

  • ITU and UNGIS will lead a task force to assess global financing gaps.
  • The IGF is confirmed as a permanent multistakeholder governance forum.
  • UNESCO, OHCHR and UNDP have thematic responsibilities relating to rights, AI ethics, digital public infrastructure and media literacy.
  • Member States are expected to embed WSIS+20 commitments in national digital strategies.
  • The private sector is reminded of its responsibility to respect human rights.

 

An important advocacy opening lies in the decision to leave digital development financing unresolved. Rather than defining a financing mechanism, the outcome mandates a technical assessment of financing gaps. In other governance domains, including climate, such technical exercises have significantly shaped political negotiations. This is particularly relevant as the United Nations continues to face financial strain due to Member State arrears.

Potential advocacy avenues

Influencing the emerging financing architecture

The financing mandate assigned to ITU and UNGIS creates a rare opportunity to shape the logic of future investment in digital development. Civil society and faith actors can intervene in the technical assessment phase to influence how financing gaps are defined, which models are considered legitimate, and whether new financing mechanisms are opened. Ethical concerns, equity considerations and sustainability principles drawn from WSIS and the Compact can be embedded at this formative stage. As seen in climate governance, early engagement in technical financing workstreams can decisively shape later political negotiations.

Which processes can we learn from?

Civil society and faith actors can draw on established precedents to shape the emerging ITU and UNGIS financing mandate. The WSIS Tunis Agenda (WSIS 2005) and the Secretary General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation (UNSG 2020) both emphasise equity and rights in digital development, providing a normative basis for a global financing facility similar to the Global Environment Facility (GEF 1994). Blended finance models already used in climate investment by the Green Climate Fund (GCF Governing Instrument 2011) show how concessional public capital can mobilise private investment while retaining social safeguards. The Digital Solidarity Fund proposed by Senegal during WSIS Phase II (WSIS PrepCom 2005) offers a clear historical reference for renewed discussion of a Digital Solidarity Contribution.

Debt for climate swaps implemented through IMF mechanisms and supported by the GCF in cooperation with Small Island Developing States (IMF 2022) provide a transferable structure for debt for digital rights swaps in low income contexts. Ethical investment screens can be grounded in the due diligence frameworks advanced by the OHCHR B Tech Project (OHCHR 2020 2023) and in the updated OECD Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct (OECD 2023). As observers such as Wolfgang Kleinwächter have argued in their analysis of digital governance trajectories (Kleinwächter 2025), that interventions at the technical assessment stage are decisive because they set the financing logic that later political negotiations will inherit.

Building a values based governance architecture between WSIS and the Global Digital Compact

A central advocacy priority is to ensure that the General Assembly interprets the relationship between WSIS and the Global Digital Compact in a way that creates a coherent, values based governance architecture rather than parallel tracks that can be exploited by powerful states and corporations. While the WSIS+20 outcome document confirms that WSIS structures remain the institutional pathway for implementing digital commitments and the Compact provides the overarching political vision, the precise articulation between these frameworks remains open. As observers of internet governance dynamics have underlined, the coming years will determine whether the system evolves towards coordination and inclusion or towards fragmentation and forum shopping.

What actions could be taken?

Faith communities and civil society organisations can work with supportive delegations to promote General Assembly language that explicitly mandates WSIS bodies, and in particular the Internet Governance Forum, to serve as core platforms for dialogue, monitoring and implementation of GDC digital commitments. This would mean that the Independent Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance, envisaged in the Compact and to be launched in Geneva in July 2026, are institutionally connected to the WSIS architecture rather than treated as separate expert processes. Such an approach would help to anchor emerging AI and data governance debates in the long standing WSIS principles that rights offline must be protected online and that governance should be inclusive, development oriented and people centred (Tunis Agenda, WSIS 2005).

From a digital justice perspective, this governance architecture should be explicitly tasked with addressing structural inequality, digital extractivism and shrinking civic space, not only connectivity and innovation. Advocacy can therefore push for General Assembly resolutions to request that the IGF and related WSIS follow up processes systematically report on issues such as surveillance, discrimination in automated systems, the safety of human rights defenders online and the protection of children and marginalised communities. Faith actors, whose transnational networks often reach where secular civil society cannot safely operate, are particularly well placed to bring grounded testimonies and ethical framing into these discussions. By insisting that WSIS mechanisms operationalise the GDC through a justice centred lens, advocates can help prevent the Compact from being interpreted narrowly as a technical or security agenda and instead ensure that it strengthens global commitments to dignity, participation and accountability.

Establishing a participatory digital justice review mechanism

Given that neither WSIS nor the Global Digital Compact creates binding legal obligations, a key gap in the current architecture is the absence of a structured, participatory review mechanism that can generate public accountability. Rather than focusing only on general reporting obligations, advocacy can be more ambitious and call for the General Assembly to establish a regular digital justice review process modelled on successful UN mechanisms such as the Universal Periodic Review in the Human Rights Council and the voluntary national reviews under the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development.

Under such a mechanism, states would periodically present, in an accessible format, how they are implementing their WSIS+20 and GDC commitments, including on issues such as data governance, platform accountability, civic space online, algorithmic discrimination, environmental impacts of digital infrastructures and the protection of human rights defenders and journalists. UN entities with thematic responsibilities in the WSIS outcomes, including UNESCO, OHCHR and UNDP, could be invited to submit analytical inputs drawing on their country level work, while the Office of the Secretary General’s Envoy on Technology could provide an overview of systemic trends, following the approach of the Roadmap for Digital Cooperation (UNSG 2020).

Crucially, the review should institutionalise the participation of civil society, faith communities and affected groups. Building on precedents where faith-based organisations have submitted shadow reports to human rights mechanisms, the General Assembly could encourage the submission of independent community reports that document digital harms, as well as good practices in rights respecting governance. In contexts where civic space is severely restricted, churches and other faith actors, who often remain among the most trusted institutions, could serve as safe intermediaries for testimonies that cannot be voiced openly. This would make visible the lived experiences of those most affected by surveillance, online harassment, biometric control and exclusion from digital services.

By framing the review explicitly as a digital justice exercise rather than a narrow technology assessment, such a mechanism would help to bridge the current morality gap described in analyses such as the Club of Rome’s Earth for All (2023), where extreme inequality and eroding trust fuel instability. It would create a structured space where states must publicly engage with ethical concerns about superintelligent AI, autonomous weapons and the securitisation of digital infrastructures, in dialogue with communities and experts. Over time, this participatory review could generate a body of practice and expectations that, while not legally binding, would carry significant political and moral weight in guiding how WSIS and GDC commitments are interpreted and implemented across the UN system.

Consolidating the human rights foundation of General Assembly follow up

The Global Digital Compact places significant emphasis on a rights based digital future, but this commitment will only influence institutional practice if it is repeatedly affirmed through General Assembly resolutions. Advocacy can therefore focus on ensuring that forthcoming digital governance resolutions explicitly reference the Compact’s human rights commitments and require UN bodies to integrate them into their implementation work. Doing so would help create continuity between the WSIS principle of rights offline and online and the broader UN human rights framework. It could also counterbalance narratives that prioritise sovereignty or security at the expense of accountability and participation. Strengthening this interpretative baseline at the General Assembly level is essential for guiding how agencies such as UNESCO, OHCHR, UNDP and the ITU understand their mandates during the new implementation cycle.

3 Global Digital Compact

The adoption of the Global Digital Compact at the 2024 Summit of the Future (A/RES/79/1) marked a significant consolidation of the United Nations digital governance landscape. It reaffirmed the normative foundations established by the World Summit on the Information Society and introduced new commitments on rights, accountability and institutional coordination for the next phase of global digital cooperation. For organisations working on digital justice, the period between the adoption of the Compact and its high-level review in 2028 represents a concentrated window in which to influence both interpretation and implementation.

The Compact establishes several institutional mechanisms intended to bring greater coherence and scientific grounding to global digital governance. Among the most consequential is the Independent Scientific Panel on AI, tasked with providing evidence based analysis to support the implementation of the Compact’s artificial intelligence commitments. Its annual reports and thematic briefs will form part of the formal preparatory record for the 2028 review at the eighty second session of the General Assembly. This offers an important opportunity for civil society and expert organisations to shape the analytical and normative basis for future UN deliberations on AI.

A second key mechanism is the United Nations Global Dialogue on AI Governance. Mandated by the Compact, it is designed as an inclusive venue for governments and stakeholders to address governance challenges arising from rapid AI development. The first meeting of the Dialogue will take place in 2026 in Geneva, aligned with the ITU AI for Good Global Summit, followed by a 2027 session in New York alongside the Multistakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals. These meetings are expected to be early political sites where the interpretation of the Compact’s AI provisions begins to take shape.

Together, these mechanisms form part of a broader post-Compact governance ecosystem that brings scientific expertise, multistakeholder engagement and intergovernmental negotiation into closer alignment. For actors working on digital justice, the priority is to identify where meaningful influence can be exerted on agenda setting, normative development and evidence generation, and to engage strategically across the UN system and regional bodies to ensure that rights, accountability and equitable digital development remain central to the implementation of the Compact.

Potential advocacy avenues

The Independent Scientific Panel on AI

The Independent Scientific Panel on AI is one of the central mechanisms created to implement the Global Digital Compact (A/RES/79/1). It is mandated to provide evidence-based analysis on artificial intelligence and related digital technologies, and its outputs, including annual reports and thematic briefs, will form part of the official record for the 2028 high level review at the eighty second session of the General Assembly. This creates a structured channel through which civil society, academic institutions and faith-based organisations can influence the knowledge base on which political decisions will rest.

Engagement will primarily take the form of responding to calls for input, contributing case material on harms and good practices, and participating in expert consultations. Submissions that document discrimination, impacts on workers, environmental costs, and risks to civic space are particularly important, as they can help ensure that the Panel’s analysis reflects the lived realities of vulnerable communities rather than only the perspectives of states and industry. In practice, this means preparing well-sourced evidence, developed in partnership with existing digital rights organisations and research institutes, and explicitly linking it to the Compact’s commitments on rights, accountability and sustainable development.

United Nations Global Dialogue on AI Governance

The United Nations Global Digital Compact mandates the establishment of a Global Dialogue on AI Governance as an inclusive space for governments and stakeholders to address pressing governance challenges arising from rapid advances in artificial intelligence. The first meeting of the Global Dialogue on AI Governance is scheduled to take place in Geneva from 7 to 10 July 2026, in the margins of the International Telecommunication Union AI for Good Global Summit. A second meeting is planned for May 2027 in New York alongside the Multistakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals. The Dialogue is co-chaired by Ambassador Egriselda López of El Salvador and Ambassador Rein Tammsaar of Estonia.

Although the Dialogue does not adopt binding instruments, it will be one of the first political arenas in which early interpretations of the Compact’s AI provisions are negotiated. It therefore offers an important advocacy opportunity to bring forward perspectives on human rights, labour protection, environmental impact and inequality. Participation will involve engaging in preparatory consultations, organising or joining side events in Geneva and New York, and coordinating with supportive states and civil society coalitions to promote language that reflects justice oriented approaches to AI governance. In combination with contributions to the Independent Scientific Panel on AI, the Global Dialogue provides a complementary political track where evidence and normative argument can converge and begin to shape the overall direction of implementation.

4 The Internet Governance Forum

The IGF remains a space where DGC implementation can be scrutinised informally. Advocates can use the IGF main sessions, dynamic coalitions and best practice fora to produce community-endorsed guidance on how the Compact should be operationalised, drawing on the WSIS principles of a people centred and development-oriented information society. The WSIS forum annually sets out practical recommendations for digital cooperation. Because the WSIS+20 outcome document reiterates the value of continued implementation of the WSIS vision by these mechanisms, advocates can shape their agendas and outcomes to push for alignment with rights protective interpretations of the Compact. Past processes have shown that cross-community statements, such as those produced at IGF 2024, can influence UN discussions by articulating widely supported positions. Advocates can build on these models to formulate expectations regarding compact implementation and WSIS integration.

The GDC creates political commitments but no formal enforcement. This makes regional bodies such as the regional IGFs particularly important implementation sites. There is advocacy value in aligning regional instruments with Compact principles and in using them to set higher standards that can inform UN level debates.

5 UN Human Rights Architecture

The UN human rights system remains one of the most influential arenas for determining how the Global Digital Compact (A/RES/79/1) will be interpreted during its first implementation cycle. Unlike other digital governance fora, the human rights machinery produces authoritative guidance and jurisprudence that directly shapes state practice. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), mandated by the Compact to support follow up on rights, safeguards and accountability, is already expanding its work through the B Tech project (2020 to 2023), recent Human Rights Council reports on artificial intelligence and privacy, and new thematic analyses on biometric systems, discrimination by algorithm and platform governance.

Treaty bodies and Special Procedures have moved quickly to address digital harms. The Human Rights Committee has clarified obligations on surveillance under articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has issued guidance on profiling and online exploitation, and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has assessed technology-facilitated gender based violence. Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression, privacy and violence against women have also produced detailed analyses on platform governance, biometric databases and the use of automated systems in policing. These outputs will influence the interpretive basis of the Compact’s high level review in 2028.

Major civil society organisations are already using these mechanisms to shape norms. Access Now, Article 19, the Association for Progressive Communications and Privacy International submit evidence to treaty bodies, contribute to Universal Periodic Review (UPR) cycles and support Special Procedure investigations into online repression, surveillance, internet shutdowns and discriminatory algorithmic systems. Their sustained engagement has contributed to Human Rights Council resolutions on rights online, disinformation and reprisals against defenders. Their methodologies and strategic use of UN mechanisms provide a clear pathway for other actors seeking influence.

Faith based organisations can complement these efforts in concrete and practical ways. They often operate in contexts where civic space is restricted, and where secular NGOs cannot safely document digital harms. Their community proximity makes them well positioned to collect verifiable evidence on issues such as biometric registration abuses, censorship of religious minorities, internet shutdowns during elections and online targeting of human rights defenders. Many are already experienced in submitting shadow reports to UPR cycles or supporting local communities in preparing treaty body submissions. Their added value lies not in broad moral claims but in providing grounded documentation from regions that are otherwise under-reported.

Potential advocacy avenues

Prioritise OHCHR-led consultations linked to the Compact

OHCHR will be central to interpreting the Compact’s commitments on rights, safeguards and accountability. Consultations for its forthcoming guidance provide the most direct entry point for shaping how states understand obligations on surveillance, artificial intelligence and communication rights. Submissions should draw on community-level evidence and connect clearly to Compact provisions on non-discrimination, transparency and remedy. Coordination with organisations such as Access Now, Article 19 and the Association for Progressive Communications can strengthen the technical and legal robustness of submissions.

Use treaty body reviews to embed Compact commitments in binding human rights law

Treaty bodies increasingly interrogate state use of automated systems, data governance and online civic space. Shadow reports that draw explicit links between the Compact and obligations under instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Convention on the Rights of the Child provide treaty bodies with the basis to question states on digital policies. This approach, long used by Privacy International and other digital rights groups, is one of the most effective ways to create durable normative expectations.

Engage selectively with Special Rapporteurs whose mandates shape digital governance debates

The Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression, privacy, racism and violence against women consistently set analytical baselines for UN discussions on digital rights. Targeted submissions influence their thematic reports to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, which in turn inform broader follow up to the Compact. Faith based organisations can add value by providing verified community level evidence, especially from regions where digital harms are under reported.

Ensure coordinated interventions at the Human Rights Council

Digital issues appear regularly in Human Rights Council resolutions, including on the right to privacy in the digital age, freedom of expression and civic space. These resolutions shape how states subsequently implement the Compact’s human rights language. Coordinated contributions from civil society, including digital rights NGOs and faith actors, can help maintain a focus on surveillance, discrimination, platform accountability and the protection of human rights defenders in online spaces.

6 International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

The International Telecommunication Union remains one of the most consequential intergovernmental bodies shaping the technical and regulatory foundations of global digital systems. Although its mandate is rooted in telecommunications and radiocommunications, the ITU has progressively expanded its activities into standardisation and policy fields relating to artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, cybersecurity and network management. This is particularly evident in the work of the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU T) and in high profile platforms such as the AI for Good Global Summit.

The Global Digital Compact makes explicit reference to the need for coherence between normative human rights commitments and technical standard setting processes. ITU engagement is therefore critical for a digital justice alliance that seeks to contest over-centralisation, surveillance risks and the embedding of inequitable governance logics at the level of international standards.

Potential advocacy avenues

Engage early in ITU T Study Groups developing standards relevant to AI, data and digital public infrastructure

Study Groups 13 (Future Networks including cloud computing), 16 (Multimedia including AI based systems) and 17 (Security) continue to draft standards with significant governance implications. Civil society participation is limited but possible through member state delegations and academic institutions. Targeted interventions can help prevent the adoption of standards that normalise surveillance, opaque risk scoring systems or exclusionary network architectures.

Monitor and influence preparatory work for the World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA)

WTSA sets the work programme and mandates for all ITU T Study Groups. Influencing WTSA preparatory positions at regional telecommunication bodies is often more effective than engagement at the global meeting itself. Aligning these discussions with the Compact’s emphasis on rights, openness and safeguards is essential.

Use the AI for Good Global Summit as a strategic political entry point

Although the Summit is not a decision-making space, it has become a major agenda setting arena where narratives around AI governance are shaped. The Global Dialogue on AI Governance mandated by the Compact will convene back to back with the Summit in 2026, making this a critical political moment for digital justice engagement.

Promote normative coherence between WSIS principles and technical standardisation

The risk of misaligned institutional development is high when technical bodies adopt governance-relevant standards without reference to human rights commitments. Advocacy should emphasise the WSIS Tunis Agenda principles of openness, accessibility and inclusive governance as guiding norms for ITU technical standardisation.

Support transparency and public interest safeguards in ITU cybersecurity processes

The ITU T cybersecurity work, including standards and guidelines, frequently intersect with national security agendas. Advocates should push for explicit references to the Compact’s commitments on accountability, proportionality and oversight.

7 UNESCO

UNESCO has become one of the central normative bodies in the UN system for digital governance, particularly on the ethical, societal and informational dimensions of artificial intelligence and online platforms. Its recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, adopted by acclamation in 2021, is the first global standard setting instrument on AI endorsed by all 194 Member States. UNESCO has also taken the lead on information integrity through the 2023 Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms and continues to anchor digital governance debates in the WSIS principles of openness, inclusion and human centred development. The Global Digital Compact explicitly draws on these UNESCO instruments when setting commitments on rights, transparency and risk mitigation. For a digital justice alliance, UNESCO is therefore a central normative gateway, offering opportunities to shape standards that states subsequently cite when implementing the Compact.

Potential advocacy avenues

Influence the implementation of the Recommendation on the Ethics of AI

UNESCO is supporting national implementation across more than fifty states. Engaging with national working groups and UNESCO regional offices can ensure that implementation aligns with the Compact’s focus on non-discrimination, accountability and equitable digital development.

Shape the evolving work on platform governance
UNESCO’s Guidelines for the Governance of Digital Platforms form the most widely referenced UN soft law instrument in this area. Submissions to UNESCO consultations can help embed principles from the Compact on transparency, independent auditing and user rights.

Engage in the follow up to the Internet Universality ROAM X indicators

These indicators operationalise human rights, openness, accessibility and multi stakeholder participation in the digital environment. They remain deeply connected to the WSIS legacy and provide an important channel for grounding the Compact’s commitments in measurable frameworks.

Strengthen the interface between UNESCO’s normative work and the Independent Scientific Panel on AI

The Panel will draw on UNESCO’s expertise in AI ethics and information integrity. Coordinating advocacy across both spaces can ensure alignment between the Panel’s scientific assessments and UNESCO’s rights based normative guidance.

Ensure that UNESCO’s work on media and information literacy integrates Compact commitments.

Digital literacy is a central element of the Compact’s inclusion and empowerment agenda. UNESCO’s programmes in this area shape national strategies and are a key point for embedding digital justice considerations.

8 Key regional and continental dynamics

Regional digital governance ecosystems have become increasingly important arenas for shaping norms, institutional expectations and cultures of enforcement relevant to the implementation of global commitments such as the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) action lines and the emerging norms from the UN Global Digital Compact negotiations. Across all continents, existing regulatory pathways, judicial bodies and regional political institutions provide both constraints and opportunities for embedding rights-based, development-oriented and interoperable approaches to digital governance. The following provides a brief overview of the most significant regional tracks.

Africa

Africa’s engagement in global digital governance is shaped both by growing institutional consolidation and persistent structural asymmetry. The African Union has made considerable progress in establishing a coherent continental governance framework through the AU Data Policy Framework, the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa 2020 to 2030 and the Malabo Convention. These frameworks articulate a rights-based, development-oriented and sovereignty-minded approach to digital policy.

Africa, however, continues to confront deep structural disparities. The majority of countries operate in what global analyses describe as a compute desert, with limited access to high performance computing, sovereign cloud infrastructure or advanced semiconductor capacity. This deficit restricts Africa’s ability to participate in artificial intelligence development, influence global narratives or enforce regulatory decisions that depend on technical capability.

Data extractivism remains a significant concern. Much of the continent’s data enables global AI models and platform ecosystems without generating corresponding economic value or public benefit. Digital identity systems, biometric programmes and cybersecurity laws are expanding, sometimes without adequate safeguards, oversight or remedy mechanisms. These risks are magnified in contexts where civic space is restricted and where surveillance may be used against journalists, political opponents and human rights defenders.

Environmental and ecological pressures further complicate Africa’s digital landscape. E waste burdens continue to rise, informal recycling practices remain hazardous and mineral extraction required for global AI supply chains places pressure on fragile ecosystems. These extractive demands intersect with conflict dynamics in several regions.

Despite these challenges, Africa is an increasingly important governance actor. The AU Commission, ECOWAS, SADC and regional telecommunications bodies influence the continent’s collective positions in WSIS related forums, UN General Assembly debates, ITU processes and UNESCO dialogues. Engagement with these institutions is vital for embedding rights, accountability, environmental sustainability and compute equity into global implementation pathways.

Europe

Europe remains one of the most influential norm setting regions for global digital governance. The European Union’s regulatory instruments and the Council of Europe’s binding treaty on artificial intelligence establish a comprehensive and rights-grounded approach. Europe has become a global reference point for regulatory ambition.

However, internal tensions are growing. The emerging Omnibus initiative, aimed at reducing regulatory burdens and accelerating European competitiveness, risks diluting protections relating to privacy, algorithmic accountability, worker rights and environmental standards. The shift reflects a broader geopolitical concern that Europe is losing ground in frontier AI innovation and digital industrial capacity, prompting political pressure for regulatory relaxation.

This tension sits alongside risks posed by shifting global supply chains, increasing reliance on foreign compute capacity and the need to secure access to critical minerals. These factors influence the extent to which Europe can maintain its commitment to WSIS principles, the Global Digital Compact and broader human rights obligations.

Nevertheless, Europe’s jurisprudence and oversight mechanisms remain essential for anchoring global norms related to transparency, non-discrimination, meaningful human control, environmental responsibility and protection of civic space. Influencing Europe’s internal debates, including Omnibus reforms, is therefore a vital strategy for sustaining a values-driven global governance architecture.

Latin America

Latin America is characterised by a historically strong human rights ecosystem, active regional courts and a diverse civil society that engages deeply with questions of power, extractivism and digital sovereignty. The region has enacted some of the strongest data protection laws in the Global South and is developing AI governance frameworks that foreground rights, transparency and democratic participation.

Regional dynamics are shaped by the economic and ecological pressures associated with critical minerals. Global demand for lithium, cobalt and copper places significant strain on indigenous communities, land rights systems and regional ecosystems. These extractive pressures intersect with broader geopolitical interest in resource access, resulting in complex negotiations between states, corporations and communities.

The region is also an emerging site of innovation in alternative digital models. Community-based AI projects, open technologies and feminist digital justice initiatives illustrate how artificial intelligence can be developed in ways that reflect collective values, linguistic diversity and environmental responsibility. This experimentation stands in contrast to dominant commercial AI models that concentrate power and reinforce inequalities.

Latin America benefits from a robust regional human rights framework. The Inter American Commission on Human Rights and its special mechanisms have issued authoritative guidance on surveillance, platform responsibility, biometric governance and algorithmic discrimination. These bodies shape state practice and provide a strong normative foundation for influencing the implementation of the Global Digital Compact.

The region is well placed to develop coordinated positions that emphasise transparency, equitable financing, environmental protections, the rights of marginalised groups and public interest oversight. Such regional positions could carry significant weight in UN General Assembly debates and WSIS-related processes.

Asia Pacific

The Asia Pacific region exhibits the greatest diversity in institutional capacity, governance approaches and political contexts. It includes highly regulated states with advanced digital infrastructures as well as regions where regulatory fragmentation, political instability and limited institutional capacity hinder the development of consistent digital rights frameworks.

Across much of Asia, digital policy is shaped by national security priorities. Mandatory SIM registration, biometric digital identity systems, expansive cybersecurity laws and restrictions on online expression are increasingly common. These measures often operate without independent oversight and pose significant risks to privacy, civic participation and media freedom.

In contrast, some jurisdictions in the region are developing sophisticated digital governance frameworks, including privacy protections, AI guidelines and oversight mechanisms. However, regional coherence remains limited. ASEAN has published several digital frameworks, but their implementation varies significantly due to the organisation’s consensus driven structure.

The Pacific Islands face a unique combination of vulnerability and systemic exclusion. Climate change threatens infrastructure and connectivity. Reliance on foreign technology providers, limited fiscal space, geopolitical competition in the region and barriers related to cost and time zones restrict the ability of Pacific states to participate in global processes. Cultural, linguistic and epistemic erosion is emerging as a key concern in a digital ecosystem dominated by external actors.

Despite these constraints, Asia Pacific civil society remains highly active. Regional networks advance feminist digital justice frameworks, community-governed digital tools, decolonial data governance and culturally grounded digital literacy. Platforms such as the Asia Pacific Internet Governance Forum and the Digital Rights Asia Conference offer critical convening spaces where WSIS principles and GDC commitments can be embedded into national and regional governance processes.

Asia Pacific remains an essential region for advancing digital justice, particularly at the intersection of climate vulnerability, security legislation, data sovereignty and cultural survival. Strengthening inclusive governance mechanisms in this region is essential for a balanced implementation of the Global Digital Compact.

Caribbean

The Caribbean’s digital governance environment is shaped by structural vulnerability, regional cooperation and increasing exposure to geopolitical competition. CARICOM and the Caribbean Telecommunications Union remain the primary institutional anchors through instruments such as the CARICOM Digital Transformation Strategy and the CTU’s Model Harmonised ICT Policy, which emphasise resilience, rights-based data governance and regional interoperability. These frameworks reflect the region’s longstanding engagement with WSIS action lines and its contributions to UN level processes. Additional regional bodies reinforce these efforts. The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States is implementing a multi country digital transformation programme focused on inclusive service delivery, while the Caribbean Development Bank has begun integrating rights enabling language into its digital transformation action plans. Regulatory actors such as ECTEL contribute to regional coordination on transparency and consumer protection across telecommunications markets.

Despite these institutional pathways, structural asymmetries persist. Many Caribbean states remain reliant on foreign cloud services, external technical capacity and imported digital infrastructure, leaving them vulnerable to regulatory capture and external shocks. Climate related disruptions amplify these risks by undermining network resilience and constraining participation in global debates on compute equity, AI development and data governance. Regional courts, including the Caribbean Court of Justice, are increasingly relevant for adjudicating issues connected to expression, data protection and mediated discrimination, although jurisprudence remains nascent. Civil society and regional networks participate actively in the Caribbean Internet Governance Forum and contribute to WSIS and IGF processes, often foregrounding climate vulnerability, cultural preservation and equitable access to digital public goods. Strengthening these regional mechanisms is essential for embedding rights, environmental responsibility and inclusive governance into the interpretation and implementation of the Global Digital Compact.

Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa region presents a complex governance landscape marked by rapid digital investment, institutional fragmentation and constrained civic space. Several Gulf states have adopted ambitious data protection laws and national AI strategies, positioning themselves as emerging hubs for frontier technologies. The Arab League’s Arab Digital Agenda, together with technical coordination facilitated by entities such as the Arab ICT Organisation and the Arab Regulators Network for Telecommunications and ICT, provides a regional framework for standard setting on cybersecurity, data policies and digital identity systems. The Gulf Cooperation Council adds a parallel layer of coordination, particularly in areas of cybersecurity and digital market integration, while the Islamic Development Bank increasingly shapes national digital ecosystems through financing and capacity building programmes that intersect with questions of digital inclusion and development.

These institutional efforts coexist with entrenched structural risks. Across much of the region, expansive surveillance infrastructures, biometric registration systems and security driven cybersecurity laws operate with limited independent oversight, creating acute vulnerabilities for journalists, civil society and human rights defenders. North African states engage both with Arab regional bodies and with African Union mechanisms, producing hybrid governance trajectories that affect the regional interpretation of WSIS and GDC commitments. Human rights oversight within the region remains weak but not irrelevant.

The Arab Human Rights Committee has begun to address issues related to online expression and discrimination, offering a modest channel for rights based engagement. At the same time, regional multistakeholder spaces such as the revived MENA Internet Governance Forum provide critical venues for debate on data justice, platform governance, labour rights in digital economies and the impacts of biometric systems. Together, these dynamics shape the region’s capacity to influence global governance discussions and highlight the importance of grounding emerging digital policies in rights, safeguards and meaningful participation.

9 How to amplify influence through new types of coordination

Coordinating mission-driven advocacy across a portfolio of actors

Mission-driven approaches, as developed in the OECD’s work on strategic governance and public value, emphasise the need for coordinated portfolios of interventions rather than isolated actions. They recognise that complex challenges require many actors working towards a shared mission, each bringing different strengths, legitimacy and operational capacities. Applying this logic to digital governance allows the ecumenical community and its partners to structure their advocacy in a coherent and strategic manner. It makes it possible to link local experience, global policy debates and value-driven framing within one coordinated effort.

The mission in this context is clear: to shape global and regional digital governance so that it advances dignity, justice and the common good, in line with the 2021 “Communication for Social Justice in a Digital Age” Manifesto. To pursue this mission, the advocacy ecosystem must function as a portfolio, with each actor playing a specific role that reinforces the others.

Faith institutions, because of their moral authority, societal reach and narrative influence, are essential components of this portfolio. They complement and amplify the work of secular civil society rather than replace it. In many countries they remain among the most trusted institutions, capable of shifting public opinion and public behaviour at scale. This capacity enables them to elevate digital justice concerns in ways that resonate broadly and that ground global policy debates in lived experience.

The mission-driven roles

The Advocate

Bodies such as the World Council of Churches can engage directly in formal governance arenas including the General Assembly, the Internet Governance Forum, the Human Rights Council, the ITU and UNESCO. Their interventions can translate ethical principles into policy language and help ensure that WSIS+20 and GDC commitments are understood through justice-centred frames. Their presence also signals to governments that faith actors expect accountability and rights-based implementation.

The Knowledge Contributor

WACC and its partners can gather lived evidence from communities most affected by digital exclusion, discrimination, disinformation and labour precarity. This evidence is essential for informing global bodies such as the Independent Scientific Panel on AI, treaty bodies and UNESCO’s monitoring processes. It also strengthens the legitimacy of the portfolio by ensuring that advocacy is grounded in real experience.

The Narrative Builder

Churches, ecumenical academies and faith based media possess an exceptional ability to influence public opinion. Through sermons, publications, study circles and digital literacy initiatives, they can frame digital governance as a question of human dignity, relationality and the common good. This narrative work supports secular civil society advocacy by helping broaden public understanding and by creating public support for rights-based reforms.

The Convenor

Faith networks have an unparalleled ability to bring together diverse actors who might otherwise not meet. Regional councils and diocesan structures can convene community groups, civil society organisations and policy makers in safe and trusted settings. These convenings provide space for dialogue, alignment and shared strategy across sectors. Secular partners often rely on faith networks to gain access to communities and stakeholders who are otherwise difficult to reach.

The Protector

In contexts where civic space is restricted, faith communities often act as protectors of vulnerable groups. Parishes and faith-based organisations provide physical and social sanctuary for human rights defenders, women facing online abuse, linguistic minorities and others who are targeted by digital harms. This protective role allows advocacy portfolios to continue functioning even when other spaces close. It also brings ethical weight to calls for stronger safeguards in AI governance, platform regulation and surveillance oversight.

10 From Manifesto to Action

The 2021 “Communication for Social Justice in a Digital Age” Manifesto sets out a principled commitment to dignity, participation, justice and the protection of vulnerable communities in digital environments. The coming implementation cycle for WSIS+20 and the Global Digital Compact creates a period in which its ideas can be translated into concrete institutional gains. The advocacy opportunities identified across this report provide direct pathways for turning the Manifesto’s values into implementable positions within UN and regional governance processes.

Pillar 1: Protecting Rights, Participation and Accountability in Digital Governance

This report identifies several practical points at which the Manifesto’s call for participatory and rights-centred governance can shape institutional decisions. The UN General Assembly’s interpretation of the relationship between WSIS and the Compact will define which bodies monitor accountability. Advocacy at this level can help ensure that the Internet Governance Forum is recognised as a venue where implementation of Compact commitments can be scrutinised by civil society. The financing mandate given to ITU and UNGIS offers another entry point. Faith-based actors and civil society partners can intervene in the early technical work on financing gaps, drawing attention to transparency, equity and accountability. OHCHR’s new responsibilities under the Compact provide a further route for influencing state behaviour. Contributing evidence to its consultations on surveillance, platform regulation and artificial intelligence ensures that decisions reflect lived experience rather than abstract policy debates.

Pillar 2: Meaningful Connectivity, Inclusion and Communication Justice

The Manifesto’s insistence that communication is a public good aligns with the connectivity and inclusion agenda in WSIS and the Compact. Opportunities identified in this report include engaging at the World Telecommunication Development Conference to support community-led connectivity models, influencing universal service fund transparency at African Union and Pacific Island forums, and using the WSIS Forum to build alliances around affordability, linguistic inclusion and culturally grounded digital access. Regional IGFs in Africa, Asia Pacific and Latin America provide pragmatic platforms for shaping stakeholder expectations before they reach global processes.

Pillar 3: AI Justice, Worker Protection and Ethical Innovation

The Manifesto’s ethical commitments can be connected directly to the institutional mechanisms set out in the Compact. The Independent Scientific Panel on AI will shape how risks, safeguards and accountability are interpreted before the 2028 review. Engagement with its calls for evidence can influence the Panel’s analytical framing. UNESCO’s ongoing work on national implementation of the Recommendation on the Ethics of AI offers another route for embedding the Manifesto’s concerns about discrimination and vulnerability. Treaty body reviews under ICCPR, CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child remain key spaces for raising issues such as algorithmic discrimination, biometric misuse and automated worker surveillance. The report also highlights the need to follow standards discussions in ITU T Study Groups 13, 16 and 17, where technical standards with governance impact are being drafted. These interventions are tangible and align with the operational nature of the Manifesto.

Pillar 4: Truth, Freedom, Safety and the Information Environment

The Manifesto’s focus on truth, safe participation and media pluralism corresponds directly with UNESCO’s 2023 Guidelines on platform governance and the WSIS+20 commitments on media development. The opportunities identified in this report provide routes for shaping these norms. Contributions to UNESCO’s information integrity consultations can support multilingual moderation, transparency requirements and independent oversight. Human Rights Council resolutions on privacy and freedom of expression provide a normative anchor for how states implement the Compact. Submissions to the Special Rapporteurs on expression, privacy and violence against women offer concrete channels for addressing online targeting, hate speech, gender-based harms and disinformation practices. Regional mechanisms in Africa and the Americas also present opportunities for reinforcing remedies and oversight.

Pillar 5: Environmental Digital Justice

The report identifies practical spaces where environmental stewardship can be integrated into digital governance in line with the Manifesto. Advocacy within ITU on procurement standards related to repairability, energy use and e-waste can influence major markets. UNDP digital public infrastructure processes provide an entry for integrating climate concerns into national digitisation plans. WSIS and IGF environmental tracks offer spaces for shaping narratives about environmental digital justice and directing attention to community-based climate data and circular economy models

Conclusion

Several developments identified in this report now exceed the conceptual scope of the 2021 “Communication for Social Justice in a Digital Age” Manifesto. The Manifesto offers a strong moral grounding for communication rights and digital justice, but it was drafted before the current governance landscape took shape and therefore does not explicitly address several issues that have since become central to global negotiations. These include the rapid emergence of superintelligent and autonomous systems as a matter of geopolitical concern, the integration of digital governance into military strategy, and the accelerating securitisation that characterises the present institutional environment. The Manifesto also predates the financing debates opened up by WSIS+20 and the Global Digital Compact, including the possibility of new global financing mechanisms, digital solidarity contributions and the treatment of data as a commons.

Furthermore, while the Manifesto addresses justice and inclusion in broad terms, it does not set out positions on the procedural mechanisms now available, such as the Independent Scientific Panel on AI, the Global Dialogue on AI Governance or the technical standardisation arenas of the ITU. These developments raise substantive and procedural questions that the original text does not fully anticipate, suggesting that a short addendum may be warranted to clarify positions on high-risk AI, digital financing, environmental digital justice and the institutional architecture through which these issues will be decided.

This report was commissioned by the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) and authored by Christina Dahl Jensen, Senior Consultant and AI Strategist, Tinkr. March 2026

References

Africa

African Union Data Policy Framework (2022)

https://au.int/en/documents/20220728/au-data-policy-framework

AU Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa 2020–2030

https://au.int/en/documents/20200518/digital-transformation-strategy-africa-2020-2030

AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention, 2014)

https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-protection

ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection (2010)

https://archives.ecowas.int/supplementary-act-a-sah-p-1-10-on-personal-data-protection-within-ecowas/

SADC Model Law on Data Protection (2013)

https://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/sadc-model-law-data-protection

Europe

General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj

Digital Services Act (DSA) – Regulation (EU) 2022/2065

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj

Digital Markets Act (DMA) – Regulation (EU) 2022/1925

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj

EU Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act, 2024)

Consolidated text published after political agreement:

https://artificialintelligenceact.eu

Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (2024)

https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/framework-convention

Draghi Report on EU Competitiveness (2024)

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en

Latin America

Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados (LGPD), Brazil (2018)

English overview from the Brazilian DPA (ANPD):

https://www.gov.br/anpd/en/lgpd-english-version

Inter American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) – Special Rapporteurships

https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/rapporteurships.asp

Inter American Court of Human Rights – advisory opinions and jurisprudence database

https://www.corteidh.or.cr/index-en.html

Asia

ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM 2025)

https://asean.org/book/asean-digital-masterplan-2025/

ASEAN Cross Border Data Flows Framework (2021)

https://asean.org/asean-cross-border-data-flows-mechanism/

Asia Pacific Regional Internet Governance Forum (APrIGF)

https://aprigf.asia

Digital Rights Asia Pacific (DRAP) Conference

SUBMIT

Global Context / Background

World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Outcome Documents https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/

Global Digital Compact – Process and Official Documents

https://www.un.org/techenvoy/global-digital-compact

CircleID: Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Governance Outlook 2026: Finding the Right Path Between Fear and Hope” https://circleid.com/posts/internet-governance-outlook-2026-finding-the-right-path-between-fear-and-hope