Digital justice and cultural integrity for a people without a country
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Digital justice and cultural integrity for a people without a country

Badrul Hassan

In the world’s largest refugee camp, ask a Rohingya family in Cox’s Bazar how they manage mobile connectivity. For years, the answer could be managing two SIM cards, not one. A Bangladeshi SIM was often obtained informally because Rohingya refugees could not legally register one in their own names. A Myanmar SIM could still be kept alive where the signal reaches across the border.

The first might have been registered in the name of someone else. The second offered something the first could not, which is a way to call a cousin or relative in Myanmar, close enough to reach across the border into a country that still refuses to recognise the word “Rohingya”. By late 2025, however, the situation in Bangladesh began to change. The government started a pilot to issue authorised SIM cards to registered Rohingya refugees, creating a legal route to mobile connectivity for the first time. The change has significance. But it also makes the question of who controls that connection more important, not less.

The Rohingya are among the most persecuted people on earth, stateless in law and in fact. For years, many relied on phone lines they could not legally register in their own names. That is where an honest account of digital justice has to start. Not with a policy document or a UN resolution, but with a phone whose connection depends on someone else’s identity, a border signal, or a rule that can change overnight. Everything that follows, the shutdowns, the biometric systems, the fight over whose language survives online, comes after that small, ordinary fact.

The switch

On 25 August 2019, a large, peaceful rally gathered in the camps to mark two years since the exodus. Estimates ranged into the low hundreds of thousands. It was orderly, well organised, and openly political, with speakers demanding recognition, justice, and safe return with citizenship. The scale unsettled Dhaka. A stateless population meant to be waiting quietly for repatriation had organised across camps and drawn international attention on its own terms.

The authorities increasingly treated the communication infrastructure itself as a security problem. The rally had been organised substantially through mobile phones and social media. On 1 September, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission ordered telecommunications operators to shut down mobile phone services in the camps within seven days. The following day, it ordered operators to shut down 3G and 4G services in the camps each day between 5 pm and 6 am. By early September, the restrictions had hardened into a round-the-clock blackout, alongside instructions to stop selling SIM cards to Rohingya customers.1

The foreign secretary cited law and order, security, rumour and misinformation, and the risk of criminal activity, adding that the internet was not a suitable medium for authentic community messaging. A population that had just survived a campaign of violence, already stripped of a country and then a name, was now being told that its use of a telephone was itself a risk requiring management.

The blackout held for nearly a year. It took a pandemic to move it. By August 2020, with COVID spreading and UN agencies warning that refugees without connectivity faced serious barriers to health information and services, high-speed service returned after the authorities lifted the restriction.

In July 2024, mass student-led protests over public sector job quotas escalated into a nationwide uprising that eventually forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from office in early August. The government’s response during the July phase included a countrywide internet blackout lasting several days, followed by continuing restrictions on parts of online access.

The camps in Cox’s Bazar were caught in that same national shutdown. Refugees described the interruption in practical terms as they were unable to reach relatives across the border, unable to work, and in some cases unable to move money or buy food through the digital systems on which the camp economy had come to depend. Service returned as the national restrictions eased.2

A name that isn’t used

Before there was a network to switch off, the name Rohingya was already being denied. For decades Myanmar’s government has refused to use the word Rohingya in official discourse, insisting instead on “Bengali”, a term that casts the population as recent arrivals from elsewhere. The 1982 Citizenship Law then entrenched their exclusion from citizenship. The refusal to recognise the name and the refusal to recognise the citizenship claim are closely connected. The later restrictions on communication did not create that exclusion; they operated within a system in which the population’s identity was already contested.

Bangladesh’s terminology reflects both its legal position and the diplomatic circumstances of the Rohingya crisis. The Government officially designated them as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” (FDMN), rather than refugees. The choice emerged during negotiations over identity documentation, when Bangladesh resisted including the word “refugee” on registration cards and proposed the FDMN designation instead. Bangladesh is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, but the FDMN terminology was also tied to its handling of the crisis as a displacement from Myanmar and to the planned return of the population.

The terminology also had a diplomatic dimension. Bangladesh was negotiating with Myanmar over repatriation while Myanmar rejected both the name Rohingya and the description of the population as forcibly displaced. At the same time, Bangladesh did use “Rohingya” in some diplomatic and political statements, particularly when referring to their identity and their return to Myanmar.

Digital ownership is difficult on both sides of the border. In Myanmar, telecom registration has been tied to identity documentation, while the citizenship framework leaves most Rohingya without the documents associated with recognised citizenship. The National Verification Card has been controversial among Rohingya because it does not recognise them as Rohingya citizens. Many families nonetheless kept a Myanmar SIM alive through informal channels, since it was the only line that reached across the border.

The language itself carries a quieter version of the same erasure. Rohingya has a long history of oral use, alongside attempts to represent it in different scripts. Decades of displacement pushed instruction and administration towards Burmese, Chittagonian or Bangla, depending on the setting. Many Rohingya were fluent in Burmese, but their speech was rarely quite that of the majority. Their speech carried the influence of Rohingya and Rakhine, with differences in pronunciation and vocabulary that reflected where they came from and the communities in which they had lived. As a result, children often encountered formal literacy through a language different from the one spoken at home.

A small opening

The picture has been slowly changing. An app called Rohingya Zoban now teaches reading and writing in Hanifi, a modern script developed for Rohingya. The app was officially launched in Kutupalong in June 2026 with support from the Bangladesh authorities. It is a small project, run on ordinary phones, and it will not undo decades of disrupted schooling. But it offers something different. A community is building a written record in its own language rather than having one imposed or withheld.3

Put the naming dispute and the app side by side and cultural integrity gets easier to define. Reaching people with information is only part of it. What matters as much is whether the words carrying that information, and the name attached to the people receiving it, belong to them.

Infrastructure without inclusion

Whatever the state does with the switch, an entirely different apparatus runs underneath it, and this one rarely gets shut off. Every registered refugee in Cox’s Bazar carries a biometric Smart Card. It sits at the centre of an interlocking set of systems, including UNHCR’s registration ecosystem, the World Health Organization’s health information platform and the World Food Programme’s beneficiary and transfer system known as SCOPE. Food assistance uses these linked systems, with Building Blocks used in the humanitarian response as a blockchain-based platform for transactions. The technical achievement is considerable, particularly in a setting where nearly everything else about people’s legal identity is uncertain.

UNICEF and other development partners have also introduced a digital multi-channel Complaint and Feedback Redress Mechanism (CFRM) to support Accountability to Affected People (AAP), incident reporting and prevention of sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment (SEAH). The mechanism brings together feedback and complaints from different programmes and organisations in the response.

A displaced population with no state of its own is nonetheless fully legible to a coordinated set of institutions, verified and cross-referenced without the paperwork gaps that plague less organised crises.

But a study from India’s Aapti Institute, based on fieldwork inside the camps, found something less comfortable beneath that competence. The coordination system is built around the government and the largest international agencies, while local and national organisations can remain at the edges of decisions even when they may understand the community’s needs more precisely than outside actors. The infrastructure can work well without the people affected by it having an equal role in deciding how it works.4

Being connected to a system is not the same as having a hand in what that system does with you. A biometric card can reliably deliver a food ration and, at the same time, become part of a record whose use the person carrying it has little power to influence.

When protection becomes exposure

In 2021, the Bangladesh Government submitted the personal data of at least 830,000 Rohingya refugees to Myanmar for repatriation eligibility assessments. The data had been collected through the joint Bangladesh-UNHCR registration process and included biometric and other identifying information. UNHCR maintains that refugees were informed of the registration’s purposes and separately asked to consent to sharing their data with Myanmar. Human Rights Watch disputed whether this amounted to genuine informed consent. It found that UNHCR had not carried out a full data protection impact assessment and that refugees interviewed said the risks were not explained clearly. The episode leaves a difficult question at the centre of a system designed to protect people. How meaningful is consent when the same registration controls access to services?5

Here the two questions meet. The shutdown story is about access, whether a switch is on or off. The naming story is about recognition, whose word for themselves gets to count. The data transfer brings the two together. A people denied a secure legal identity also lost control over information that could be used to identify them, with the institutions built to protect them becoming part of the chain through which that information moved.

What survives anyway

The story does not end there. Across the camps, much of the work of reaching people with urgent information still happens through channels that are simpler than an app. Information hubs, radio and in-person outreach remain important because technology does not solve the problems of literacy, language and trust on its own. A signal alone does not make communication accessible.

Digital media in the camps also does something the humanitarian system cannot do for the Rohingya themselves. Phones are used to stay in touch with relatives and the diaspora, exchange news and warnings, document life in the camps and speak to audiences outside them. WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram and other platforms have become informal spaces for sharing information and maintaining community ties. Rohingya photographers and media creators are also telling their own stories rather than appearing only as subjects in someone else’s.

But access is not equal. Women and girls often have less control over phones and internet access, while language, literacy, cost and surveillance shape who can participate. What matters is who can use it, in which language, and how much control they have over what they share.

Rohingya Zoban belongs in this same category of modest, real alternatives. It is built around the community’s own script and taught in the community’s own language, which is more than most systems serving the camps can claim. The information hubs and the language app are not evidence that the wider system is becoming inclusive. They are examples of what inclusion looks like when people can recognise themselves in the way information is produced and received.

Coming back to the phone

Come back, finally, to the two SIM cards. “Nothing about us without us”, the disability rights movement’s insistence on treating people as agents in their own lives rather than as subjects of decisions made by others, is relevant here. For a stateless population, the question goes one step further. The harder question is who decides the terms on which they are permitted to speak, and what happens to their data once they do.6

With two SIMs, one can connect a Rohingya family to Bangladesh; another can connect relatives across the border. For years, neither connection was something the family could securely claim in its own name. One was unofficial; the other depended on a signal crossing a border that the people carrying the phone could not cross freely.

That is the contradiction at the heart of digital justice in the Rohingya camps. Connectivity can give people a way to speak, work, organise and remain connected to family. But access can still depend on an identity they do not possess, a system they do not control, or data they never fully agreed to surrender.

Notes

1. Human Rights Watch, “Bangladesh: Internet Blackout on Rohingya Refugees,” 13 September 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/13/bangladesh-internet-blackout-rohingya-refugees

2. Radio Free Asia, “Bangladesh internet shutdown hits Rohingya camps hard.” https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/coxs-bazar-bangladesh-rohingya-08012024132337.htm

3. Expanding Literacy: The Launch of the Rohingya Zoban Language App in Kutupalong, https://childrenontheedge.org/news/expanding-literacy-the-launch-of-the-rohingya-zoban-language-app-in-kutupalong

4. Aapti Institute case study, reported in IDN-InDepthNews, “Infrastructure Without Inclusion: What the Rohingya Camps Teach Us.” https://indepthnews.net/infrastructure-without-inclusion-what-the-rohingya-camps-teach-us/

5. Forced Migration Review, “Challenges and risks associated with biometric-enabled cash assistance.” https://www.fmreview.org/digital-disruption/siad/

6. WACC, “Nothing about us without us: Why digital justice requires communication rights,” 15 January 2025. https://waccglobal.org/nothing-about-us-without-us-why-digital-justice-requires-communication-rights/

 

Badrul Hassan is an independent consultant and writer. He has spent 26 years in humanitarian and development work across Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Papua New Guinea and Türkiye, including 16 years with UNICEF, spanning emergency response, public health, child rights and social development, carrying a consistent focus on accountability to affected populations. That work includes two of the world’s largest refugee responses, the Rohingya influx in Cox’s Bazar and the Syrian refugee response, alongside the 2023 Türkiye earthquake and COVID-19. He holds master’s degrees in International Relations and Peace, Conflict and Human Rights Studies, and writes for national dailies, international outlets and peer-reviewed journals.